In this paper I interrogate why a nation grounded with an overarching assumption of a unified community is increasingly being confronted with ruptures, breaches and anomalies when it comes to indigenous inclusion. I search the intersections of current political rhetoric and indigenous relations to uncover an entrenched colonialism in relation to this inclusion. Following Nancy's notion of partage, which connotes a sharing while sharing out, and the structure of 'engaging with' rather than 'deciding for', I sketch an originary relation of ethos that questions the material effects of a community homogenously bounded by ownership and entrepreneurialism 1 .
Introduction
Australian society is represented in the Howard government rhetoric as a harmonious unity, where all nationalities can live their quotidian moments within a tolerant diversity, with everyone pulling together for the national good. The guiding principle in this unity is that individuals cohere through a particular 'Australianness', enabling the premise of 'equality before the law' to apply across the board 2 . But what unified version of 'Australianness' could be constructed without compromising cultural difference, considering the historical trajectories of the 'settlers' in this country? What 'sameness'
will not contradict this premise of equality before the law?
As 'Australians' are collectively encouraged by the government to embody selfdetermining entrepreneurialism in this nationally bounded solidarity, sites of pronounced inclusion/exclusion in 'Australian' communities increase. The nation's communities have historically been organised within homogenising forces in which The homogenously bounded nation, under the Howard government particularly, incorporates indigenous peoples as either 'non-white' possessing participants or as dispossessed. In other words, they are included as excluded (Agamben 2003) , or included if they agree to give up their cultural specificity and conform to the homogenous community that participates in this nationally founded colonial vision.
This applies to any others deemed threatening to this homogeneity, as all succeeding migrants conform to this 'property-owning' identity. Colonial dispossession is built into the very operations of racialised power that institutionally and legislatively defines the nation (Giannacopoulos 2007: 11) .
In this paper, from my position as a non-indigenous researcher, I elaborate on how indigenous dispossession, or indigenous peoples' inclusion as exclusion, remains the groundwork of the homogenous national community in 'Australia'. Insistence on 'property-owning' identity relies on a binary opposition that operates between ongoing cultural erasure of indigenous peoples and constructions of legitimate 'settled' ownership and possession.
I first look closely at how indigenous relations of belonging reflect symbiotic coexistence and reciprocity between people and land, and how post structural ethics resonate with these relations by considering inter-subjectivity and negotiation. Then, in I also reveal how indigenous peoples actively resist this unified community that denies the pre-existence and continuity of their laws and ways of being. Their resistance witnesses how the experience of community is in fact the sharing of our incommensurable differences. Our interrelated coexistence needs to be open to disagreement and fracture (Secomb 2000: 137) in order to refuse the possessive relations that disconnect us from each other and our lived world. I argue that community is what takes place in the interrelations between recognition and continued resistance to unified conformity.
Belonging
From the earliest settler contact, indigenous peoples have been denied their very different law and land relations, which recognise belonging 'to' rather than 'possessing' land. Irene Watson explains the myth of terra nullius as the colonisers perceiving this country as "available to be filled with their beginnings of history and evolving spirit" (Watson 2002 13) . Indigenous law relations have been developed within systems of kinship responsibilities, structured through reciprocity with each other and the land.
Colonial Australian law, organised within the overarching structure of ownership in the Crown, created a fixed relation with the land and capital, dispossessing the original occupants and relegating them to the outer fringes of the 'Australian' community.
Indigenous pre-existing laws and ways of being in this country continue to threaten the legitimacy of this national community.
Ideological assumptions that require community members to perceive and behave in the same way deny the lived structure of community, in that every individual has an incommensurably different perspective. To decide for the other is to erase their difference. Self-determining equal subjects are only made possible by constructing an oppressed other. As Social Justice Commissioner Tom Calma has argued, the presumption of an identical needs-based (formal) equality before the law has long been recognised as insufficient to eliminate racial discrimination. The human rights committee adopts a substantive equality that takes into account individual concrete circumstances and is able to recognise specific aspects of discrimination (Calma 2001: 50) .
Following Jean Luc Nancy, an unconditional community accepts that subjects are not fixed identities but are always reconstituting in relation to each other. Difference is the finitude or limit that each individual shares with the other. Contrary to a selfdeterminism, Nancy says there can be no 'I' but only 'we' because subjects constitute in relation with others. The only way to allow for an incommensurable subjective perspective is to mutually recognise this fundamental subject-to-subject relation. Nancy finds that in sharing this limit relation, finitude takes place as community. Being finite is "being-in-common". He sketches this relation as "partage", which means both a partition and a partaking, or both a sharing and sharing out (Nancy 1990 ).
As all people are both joined and separated through their differences, this relation of partage can be seen as the ongoing structure of all relations. This continuous yet originary relation is a paradoxical relation that irreducibly separates while communicatively joining all relations. Communication is a "sovereign operation transgressing at the limit of discursive difference" (Derrida 1985: 115) . This relation is an ethos, to follow Derrida, the manner of being (Derrida 2001: 13) . Ethos, as a structural law, irrupts fixed structures created to organise sameness, where difference becomes appropriated.
Linnel Secomb has interpreted community as productive disagreement which disrupts the violence of assimilation based in unity. While she argues Nancy's vision of community as sharing overcomes reductive commonality, she finds that Nancy "gives insufficient attention to the forms and strategies of resistance against union and assimilation" and "turns away from sustained formulation of how difference is enacted and maintained" (Secomb 2000: 143) . I would emphasise the aporetic relation between recognition and resistance and the doubled structure of subjectivity that exceeds this opposition as the place of community. Nancy's work on "being singular plural" (Nancy 2000) sketches iterating subjectivity as both finite/infinite, demonstrating the doubled relation of differing while deferring. While singularity cannot avoid differentiation self-engendering doubling is (also) a self-differing, that is, the now doubles itself in such a way as to become a not-now to be retained in another now … the living now, producing itself by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now, be retained in another now … Such a process is indeed a pure selfaffection in which the same is the same only in affecting itself from the other (Derrida in Sallis 1992: 133, 134 ).
Self-affection, beyond oppositions, is both recognising, and beyond finite recognition (Oliver 2000).
Secomb acknowledges the doubled relation between recognition and resistance when she points to indigenous peoples' coexistent yet irreducible relations in law and Country. Their political strategy regarding indigenous sovereignty:
simultaneously demands recognition and refuses recognition: demands acceptance and refuses assimilation… [it] involves both negotiation and reconciliation and, simultaneously, resistance and disagreement (Secomb 2000: 146) . all peoples come into the laws of place, as they come into ruwi (country), even krinkis (non-indigenous) but the greater majority has no sense or recognition of laws of place as they are controlled by the idea of sovereignties of state (Watson 2002: 17) .
Inter-subjective relatedness
While fixed overarching and centralising structures continue to ideologically bind people within a colonially imagined organisation of self-sameness, a reconceptualising from the perspective of inter-subjective relatedness can reveal opportunities for mutual reciprocity and allow for negotiation in the ongoing shared production of meaning. 
Law and land relations
When the colonialists assumed a foundation for the framework of ownership in the Crown in what is now known as 'Australia', more than 250 indigenous language groups with over 500 dialects had lived, symbiotically engaged with their lands and each other, and their own law relations, for countless generations. Yet these laws have continued to structure indigenous relations within their lived experience in the present. Watson writes:
Our laws are lived as a way of life, not written down, as knowledge of law comes through the living of it. Law is lived, sung, danced, painted, eaten, walked upon, and loved, law lives in all things … It has no inner or outer, for one is all, all is one. Law is what holds this world together (Watson 2006) .
Indigenous relations remain people-and land-centric (Watson 2005) . So while the legacy of colonisation has been the reliance on objective control of Crown land, strategically managed through the accumulation of property and capital, from an intersubjective perspective there is no objective separation from land and each other. 'Country' is not an abstract concept in indigenous culture but a living entity, lived in and lived with. The notion of 'Country' is where all elements are engaged communicatively, because there is no position from which the interest of one can be disengaged from the interests of others in the generality. What is integral to understanding this interdependence of living systems is that concepts of selfdetermining individuality and ownership are problematic, as they are a source of competitiveness and alienation, disconnecting from inter-relational engagement and reciprocity (Bell 1998 25) 3 .
The difference between custodianship and ownership is pronounced. Rather than possessively controlling land, having access to, and responsibility for, land is integral to relations of custodianship. Responsibility to Country is a relation that is fundamental to the ongoing cycles of finitude and renewal, to be shared by all peoples who partake of Nungas co-existed in the law ... our identity is set in law and land... The colonial state cannot grant us who we are, for it was not theirs to give. Who we are emanates from law... Nunga relationships to ruwi [Country] are more complex than owning and controlling a piece of property... We nurture ruwi as we do our self, for we are one (Watson 2002: 18,19) . What is especially contradictory in the 99-year lease ammendments is that individualism is articulated through the legislative recognition of whole corporations as singular bodies, which, in each case, works against indigenous communal resourcing.
Leasing indigenous land

Ross argued:
it will enable the Northern Territory government to lease entire communities and subsequently sub-lease to whoever it chooses … Aboriginal people are being forced to pay for these new arrangements from the Aboriginal Benefits Account [which consists of royalties paid as compensation for mining of indigenous land] which is to pay for community development purposes (Ross 2005: 3) . Government has not consulted on this issue ... I must question the government's motives to rush this legislation through. The ultimate aim of this legislation may be to diminish the power of land councils, destabilise government structures, increase the power of the minister and take away control from traditional owners so that outsiders can come in and exploit their land and resources (Siewert 2006 ).
It is clear that it is indigenous relations
The senator was also concerned about the taking of control from traditional owners for four generations, and questioned how the leases could be said to be voluntary when this is not about self-determination, this is about saying to indigenous people… 'You have to behave like whitefellas in this country… own your own home'… this government just doesn't get it… indigenous peoples… have an intrinsic relation with the land (Crossin 2006) .
The media-supported rhetoric of self-determination reveals the exercise of possessive patriarchal whiteness as it continues to deny the fundamental structure of community.
Interrelations in people and Country express the continuity of differing and deferring, they contain the meaningful expressions of affective existence itself. Watson argues it is necessary for different realities to be put in place, in which different ways of knowing can dismantle the unequal powers of Western systems (Watson 2002: 7) . This possessiveness is what she calls muldarbi and she describes it as a sickness "divided and separated from itself". It is yet to know the freedom that comes from living/singing law (ibid: 18, 48).
Indigenous expressions of self-determination do not resemble the government's representations of self-determinism in any way. As indigenous relations recognise the finite and infinite responsibilities to land and each other, there can be no disconnection from this interrelatedness in Country. Self-determinism can only depend on mutually recognised responsibilities that are engaged in community, both individually and collectively. It is both a recognition of finite relations and the infinite relations beyond our recognition. And this highlights the necessity of protecting the specificity of individual circumstances in our relatedness.
Customary law relations
The leasing legislation was not the only indication that Federal Government strategies avoid the violence they suffered there. As the majority of indigenous crimes were for minor offenses, and mandatory sentencing in the Territory did not allow for differentiation between terms of imprisonment and seriousness of crime, it was clear that mandatory sentencing was a deeply discriminatory law (Calma 2001: 33-5) .
Customary law courts bring offenders before their community and elders, where their individual circumstances are considered in the context of their responsibilities to community. Such courts were set up in most states, showing immediate success. The attorney general in Victoria described the state's nine Koorie courts as the jewel in the justice system, as recidivism rates had reduced to almost half of non-indigenous offenders (Hulls 2006 ). Yet in the Territory, where less urbanisation had meant less hindrance to traditional lifestyles, the government had only gone as far as introducing mandatory minimum periods of detention. After much criticism of mandatory sentencing, legislation was amended to enable diversionary schemes for juveniles and an interpreting service. One such scheme had been set up in the community of Mutitjulu.
By July the National Indigenous Times had painstakingly exposed the details in circumstances that had led to the media conflation of customary law and paedophilia, In the attempt to interrupt this ideological representation of customary law as violence, the then Shadow Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Senator Evans, pointed to the efficacy of customary law in indigenous communities. He argued that if respected and negotiated with appropriately, customary law increases efficiency in cross-cultural legal relations.
He argued that the bluster over customary law was designed to distract attention from the government's poor track record in addressing family violence, stating "while the current debate suggests that violence and abuse are products of indigenous cultures, in fact…the reverse is true". He argued the systematic erosion of traditional cultural practice perpetuates these problems: the proposition that those who argue for the maintenance of indigenous cultures are condoning violence … is not only offensive but undermines efforts to understand ... Measures to combat violence which are based in false assumptions about indigenous culture and formed without indigenous input are ineffective at best and actively damaging at worst (Evans 2006) . ANU law professor Jennifer Clarke also revealed the distortions in the government's ideological representation of indigenous culture, and refocused on underlying contributors to crime which she argued were connected with social inequity and disrupted social infrastructure (Clarke 2006) . The inaccuracy of conflating customary law with paedophilia had outraged the Mutitjulu community, as it distorted perceptions of indigenous cultural practice. Clarke also noted the government's inability to comprehend how customary law would continue in indigenous relations despite legislative moves to abolish it. Though the reification of 'Australian' culture reduces non-indigenous engagement in indigenous culture, it does not render it null. For a culture that has at least 120,000 years of archeologically recorded history 7 , customary law reflects a reciprocity fundamental to indigenous cultural practices. What both Clark's and Evans' arguments demonstrate is the need to engage with the contextual detail of particular circumstances, and the structural necessity to allow for, and negotiate with, difference in law relations to avoid the violence of appropriation. Customary laws are laws of place, always situated, grounded in the circumstantial relations between community and Country. They can be seen to engage the ethos of inter-subjective responsibility. This does not occur in an objectifying overarching structure that disconnects from laws of place and the specificity of context to presume the equality of self-sameness -a presumption that determines 'we' are all 'Australians' with the 'same' law and the 'same' values.
It is clear to see this 'same' law at work when looking at the connections and interrelations underlying the emergency intervention in the Territory that has resulted in the takeover of indigenous communities' land. It is the appropriative power of possessive whiteness that calls for the application of this 'law of the same' to be applied to indigenous offenders, while taking away of any consideration of their cultural difference. And it is this possessiveness at work in the 'law and order' regime now set up in the Territory, under the guise of eradicating sexual abuse. As the legislation was rushing through the senate, there had been no charges laid in relation to the supposedly rampant abuse, despite the roll out of troops, police and medical teams.
A week before the intervention the Mutitjulu community won a protracted legal battle that proved the government's claim of mismanagement had been incorrect and the external manager was dismissed (ABC 2007 ). Yet the regime ignored the concerns of indigenous communities, health professionals, human rights and social justice advocates, lawyers, politicians, and academics across the country, who were questioning the dubious connection between taking land and ensuring wellbeing and also the taskforce's ability to see connections between social determinacy and health. Clearly, this 'one' law of muldarbi, while omitting the specific context, continues in its sick, disconnected possessiveness, to reproduce indigenous peoples as the included excluded, in order to ground and legitimise the sovereign sameness of the 'Australian' community. Watson exhorts: our laws go before and beyond a sovereignty which is held by a physical force of arms. Aboriginal law is exterior to a claimed sovereignty of the muldarbi, an exteriority that renders their claimed sovereignty a breach and violation of our natural order as their rules and regulations maintain the unlawfulness of tyranny (Watson 2002:40) . 
Reciprocal relations
This paper has looked at relations of inequality that are perpetuated and reinforced for indigenous peoples in the fixed structure of 'Australianness' overarching the 'Australian' community. It has also explored contradictions that come up in the pressure to conform to the ideological constructs of homogeneity and sameness in community, particularly considering the possessive entrepreneurial individualism reinforced by the Howard Federal Government. What has been offered as a way forward in transformative relations is that the focus should be reformulated to consider the finite/infinite structure that inter-subjective relations share, recognising this as the lived structure of community in Country. This is a focus that would provide opportunity for inter-subjective cultural exchange to be mutually responsive in its engagement. To maintain a colonialised control in indigenous communities is to keep the mechanisms hidden that compromise interrelational responsiveness.
Indigenous cultures have largely been relegated ideologically to a "cultureless remnant" (Birch 2005:151) and indigeneity objectively assessed as perpetually inadequate in taking on the reified entrepreneurial cultural apparatus. Bounded representations of sameness, modelled on colonially derived constructs of 'Australianness', misrepresent the cultural experience of inter-subjectively lived relations in this country. This is a paternalistic denial of the socio-cultural interchange that has been lived since the colonial encounter. Relations of indigenous belonging are compromised by the denial of their sovereignty and cultural difference and the continued possessive logic of tenure in land that does not comprehend that all people come into laws of place. All relations are compromised by a fixed ideological structure that requires omission of specificity in context and a conformity that requires disengagement from individual difference. This structure does not properly address the constitutive relations of finitude and renewal and partitioning and partaking that are multiply shared. And it will not properly address the richness of cultural difference that constitutes in mutual responsivity and reciprocal relations in communities. 
